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Necessities created by World War II pushed the development of technologies in various 
ways. For example, war injuries pushed the development of medicine and resulted in the 
widespread use of antibiotics. In weapons, the nuclear arms race pushed physics research and 
resulted in the development of the atomic bomb. In a similar manner, material shortages and the 
exigencies of war pushed uniform technology to adapt quickly and resulted in multiple versions 
of the Army field jacket. This paper will discuss the development of the US Army field jacket 
and the ad hoc design changes between each version, necessitated by quickly changing wartime 
conditions. Designers and researchers had to create suitable field jackets while overcoming the 
obstacles of various material shortages and the need for quick uniform production during the 
war. During World War II, the urgency of the war and wartime material shortages caused field 
jacket technology to develop in an ad hoc manner, each revision reacting to a specific problem, 
without a definite long-term goal of a permanent all-purpose field jacket. 
The advent of World War II brought about a sudden and urgent need for advanced 
uniform technologies. Research into clothing technology and material substitutes had begun in 
the interwar period, mainly to replace “strategic” and “critical” materials, where strategic 
materials were essential wartime commodities produced abroad and critical materials were the 
ones produced in America. The hope was to find substitutes for these materials in the event that 
they would become a scarce resource. However, research halted between 1934 and 1939 as 
indicated by the Quartermaster General’s annual reports for those years, which each stated that 
there had been no funds available “for the development of substitutes for strategic and critical 
raw materials, and as a consequence, no work in this connection was accomplished during the 
year” (Risch and Pitkin 18). A lack of foresight into the urgency of the impending necessity for 
substitute materials demoted materials research in the Army’s priorities. Because clothing 
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development was neglected before WWII, US Army soldiers entered combat wearing outdated 
uniforms that had been introduced in the First World War (Connell 37). Now suddenly, the 
urgent necessity for suitable combat uniforms became a priority and pushed the progress that had 
stalled during the interwar period. However, by not taking advantage of the peaceful and 
plentiful interwar period to preemptively fight the threat of material shortages, uniform 
development during WWII would be continually left behind in the race to develop material 
substitutes before the existing materials ran out. This race would lead to inefficiently applied and 
rushed developments, scrambling to react to arising material shortages and wartime needs. 
The design of the Army uniform was further complicated by its dual role as a functional 
piece of equipment and a symbolic piece of clothing. Congress Representative Mrs. Edith 
Nourse Rogers explained to the House of Representatives: 
The most distinguished characteristic of the soldier is the uniform. It is a definitive source 
of national inspiration second only to the flag. An attractive uniform, in addition to the 
natural protection which it furnishes to the soldier, greatly improves the morale. The 
proper uniform for the soldier, either in peace or war, has always been a matter of great 
interest to those in charge of the Nation’s destiny. (Blue Dress 2). 
The uniform’s roles in combat and dress situations placed a burden on designers to develop 
technologies that would increase soldiers’ defense and protection while not compromising the 
style and appearance that would represent the Army to the American and international public. 
Guided by military requests, numerous research facilities contributed to and collaborated on the 
research and development of Army uniforms. The resources and effort dedicated to clothing 
developments had increased a great deal since the onset of war. The need to quickly clothe 
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soldiers in a uniform that could fulfill a dual role in combat and dress conditions confronted the 
 
Army, and the Army was rising to meet the occasion. 
 
One of the key components of the US Army uniform was the field jacket, intended for 
both combat and dress wear. The WWI field jacket was poorly crafted and lacked real combat 
utility, and desperately needed to be redesigned (Stanton 2). The Army planned to make the new 
version warmer since the growing Japanese threat in Alaska and the occupation of bases in the 
North Atlantic were placing inappropriately dressed soldiers in cold climates (Pitkin 2). In 
addition, the dual-role field jacket was forced to become even more multi-purposed due to the 
elimination of specific Army uniforms in order to streamline the collection, removing dress and 
mess uniforms to decrease the number of uniforms from nine to four (Connell 37). The 
beginning of the war presented the US Army with the challenge to develop the technologies to 
create a field jacket that would satisfy the functions of a combat uniform, the appearance of a 
dress uniform, the warmth of a winter uniform, and the comfort of a leisure uniform—all in one. 
The M-1939 was the first redesign of the WWI field jacket and set the precedent for 
uniform development in WWII as a short-sighted process. Many adjustments had to be made 
post hoc to compensate for oversights in material shortages and the Army shied away from long- 
term clothing research in exchange for quick fixes. Figure 1 shows a military policeman wearing 
the full uniform of 1926, which was only slightly modified by the beginning of WWII to become 
the M-1939 field jacket. The jacket was single-breasted with a notched collar, lapel, non-pleated 
breast pockets, and four large brass buttons down the front (Connell 40). It was made from 18-oz 
wool serge in a dark olive drab (OD3) cloth, a color meant to camouflage and disguise troops to 
avoid detection (Fussell 57). The onset of the war gave the Army an opportunity to 
comprehensively research camouflage technology and develop the optimal uniform disguise. 
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Figure 1 (Stanton 6) 
 
 
However, such studies would take two years and 
thousands of dollars—an investment the Army 
didn’t consider justifiable (Risch and Pitkin 35). 
The Army instead settled for the one-tone olive- 
drab color from simple camouflage analysis. In 
trying to save its limited resources, the Army 
made a hurried, short-sighted decision that 
delayed camouflage development. The topic 
would be revisited in each version of the field 
jacket, changing the shade of the olive drab 
multiple times over more than two years rather 
than conducting a one-time comprehensive 
study. This wasted money and production on subpar camouflage designs in order to respond to 
the exigent wartime need for uniforms. 
The quick mass production of subpar camouflaged jackets also exemplifies one of the 
threats to uniform advancement in WWII. That is, once an initial version of camouflage had been 
distributed, it became costly to supplant it with a new, improved version. Despite the potential 
benefits of better camouflage, the costs of production, distribution, and old disposed uniforms 
combined with a tight wartime budget might decide to leave its soldiers in outdated camouflage. 
This tradeoff could occur in any one of the many different uniform features. However, the War 
Department had issued a “policy of modernization” to protect against this very threat: 
The policy of the War Department is to develop and complete the best types of 
equipment and armament in time of peace, irrespective of the amount on hand as a result 
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of the World War. Wherever the amount of a particular article of equipment or armament 
on hand precludes the possibility of production of a newer type, nevertheless the new 
type will be adopted, and complete specifications drawn up and approved. (Risch 53) To 
monitor uniform conditions and deficiencies, each Army branch was required to produce annual 
surveys that listed their equipment and armament, whereupon the Supply Division of the General 
Staff would call for revised designs where considered necessary. In the very first year, seventy 
items were reported as needing design improvement with many of the complaints concerning the 
WWI uniform quality and constantly arising needs for changes (WPA Sewing). The problems 
were reported “in the form of directives for specific developments” and addressed one at a time 
when they arose rather than predicting possible future problems and preempting them with 
innovative design (Pitkin 2). While this policy aimed to propel uniform advancements in spite of 
existing stocks, it effectively encouraged the ad hoc development of uniforms. By having 
uniform deficiencies be reported and resolved one at a time, the Army would always be 
responding to the last problem instead of anticipating future problems and designing a field 
jacket with foresight and long-term goals. 
This lack of foresight in regards to material shortages is seen in the changes applied to the 
M-39 field jacket over the course of its use. A year after its production in 1940, a silk shortage 
replaced the silk tie with a wool tie. Only a year later, the wool shortage led to both the 
substitution of the wool tie with an olive drab mohair tie and the removal of the jacket’s pleats to 
conserve material (Stanton 23; Risch 88). The material shortages had been anticipated since the 
onset of war, but the rushed necessity for combat jackets paired with the lack of materials and 
clothing research preceding the war led the Army to quickly produce basic and usable jackets, 
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only later amending them in response to the material shortages. Already at the beginning of the 
war, there was a clear lack of foresight in Army field jacket design. 
Still after the changes, the M-1939 left a lot to be desired by the soldiers. The jackets were 
poorly insulated and provided little protection from the wind and rain, and the ineffective olive 
drab camouflage left the soldiers as readily visible targets (Henry 5). In addition, increasing 
material shortages pushed the Army to remove all unnecessary uses of scarce materials from the 
uniforms. On June 11, 1941, The Under Secretary of War emphasized the need for a 
comprehensive conservation policy, and supply services were tasked with the job of developing a 
“Priorities Critical List,” which identified the items that absolutely required the use of a critical 
material (e.g. a material that was scarce) and could not be made with a substitute material 
without compromising essential military efficiency (Risch 59). The Army began development of 
suitable substitutes for non-obligatory uses of critical materials, with emphasis that “substitutes 
should not be construed as meaning ‘equal’ or ‘equivalent,’ but should be interpreted as meaning 
‘those that will serve the same essential purpose even though may be less durable and involve 
some increased initial or ultimate cost” (Risch and Pitkin 19). This policy would see the 
development of some substitute materials that were used only for temporary fixes while others 
would develop into long-lasting and widely used materials. However, the Army was ready to 
compromise certain aspects of the field jacket in order to save critical materials during the 
wartime emergency. With a willingness to use sub-optimal materials in the uniforms, the Army 
was not hoping to create an optimal, permanent uniform, but to settle during the chaotic 
wartime for acceptable uniforms made with whatever materials were available. 
The increasing material shortages pushed the US Army to discard the wool-serge M-39 
jacket and develop the M-1941, or the Parson’s jacket, which was named after its designer Major 
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General J.K. Parsons and constructed for style and comfort (Stanton 82). The wool and metals 
shortages were the driving force behind the quick development and implementation of the M-
41. 
 
Figure 2 shows soldiers 
shipping out wearing Parson’s 
jackets. In order to address the 
problem of wind and rain 
resistance, the Parson’s jacket 
was modeled after civilian 
windbreakers, which lent a more 
weatherproof nature to the 
jackets (Henry 6). This jacket 
 
Figure 2 Parson’s Jacket/M-1941 (U.S. Field) was made of water-repellent 
 
cotton poplin instead of the scarce wool-serge and featured slash pockets with flaps and plastic 
buttons, which replaced the formerly brass buttons. In addition to the existing wool shortage, a 
metal shortage was arising, and the copper shortage in particular affected the clothing industry 
(Stanton 81). 
The copper shortage was more unexpected than the wool shortage since in 1937, the US 
had been producing copper at a record amount. However by 1941, the 1940 rearmament 
program’s production of ammunition and shell casings along with the expanding industrial 
economy were making active use of the copper resources, resulting in an acute deficiency and 
need for substitutes (Risch and Pitkin 20). A considerable amount of uniform hardware, 
including buckles, clips, grommets, snaps, and eyelets, used copper alloys such as brass and 
bronze. Bronze was used for its durability and strength while brass was valued for its high polish 
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and gold-like appearance, a status symbol for its wearer. In fact, brass buttons were rarely seen 
on civilian dress and distinguished the revered soldier (Fussell 35). However, as these metals 
became harder to procure, the military had to make concessions in the uniform’s appearance in 
order to preserve its function. Enamel-coated iron, steel, and zinc replaced the brass in grommets 
and legging eyelets, but proved too soft for cartridge and pistol belt eyelets. The search for a 
harder substitute material led to the advancement of plastics technology in uniforms (Risch 62). 
Plastics were a relatively new field of industry and its importance during WWII in 
developing uniform technologies lent huge progress to the field. Plastics were harder than zinc, 
able to withstand friction, and such a versatile material that secondary plastic substitutes became 
necessary to replace the first substitutes that began running low in availability (Risch 74). 
However, plastics were classified as “substitute standard,” giving them a reputation as a 
substitute, temporary material “to be tolerated only for the duration” of the war (Raeburn 143). 
This public opinion reflects the Army’s ad hoc application of plastic substitutes, using them only 
to directly address brass shortage problems rather than applying them innovatively and fully 
exploiting their development and capabilities (Beall). The Army had introduced plastics as a 
cheap imitation substitute material rather than the technological advancement that they truly 
were.  After the war, there was uncertainty about plastic’s continued role during peacetime. 
Thus, while the scarcity of metals during WWII brought about redesigns of the field jacket and 
the development of substitute technologies such as plastics, its short-sighted treatment of the 
replacement materials as temporary fixes had far-reaching effects into other industries, nearly 
preventing America from entering what could be called “the plastic age” following the Second 
World War (Raeburn 141). 
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Figure 3: M-1941/Parson’s jacket (left) and M-1943 
experimental field jacket (right) (Stanton 95) 
 
 
In 1993, the Army undertook a 
project to consolidate the multitude of 
special-purpose troop uniforms and by 
developing an all-purpose field jacket 
to replace the Parson’s jacket, which 
proved too light for cold climates. This 
experimental field 
jacket endured one of the most 
rigorous research and trial periods of 
any of the WWII field jackets.  The 
Military Planning Division adopted 
layering technology, taking advantage 
of warm air trapped between layers of 
clothing, producing a versatile garment 
 
that could be worn alone for mild weather or combined with pile garments for more severe 
climates (Siple). The result was the M-1943 field jacket, which is shown on the right in Figure 3 
compared to the Parson’s jacket on the left. 
The new technologies seen on the M-43 field jacket had very specific functions in 
combat. Adjustable tie cords were added at the wrists, waist, and throat for wind protection; four 
large ‘handwarmer’ cargo pockets largely increased carrying capacity and ease of access; a neck 
flap could be buttoned across the throat for warmth, and a hood was added a year later also for 
warmth. The jacket was olive drab OD7, a darker shade, retained the bi-swing back and the 
plastic buttons, a reminder of the metals shortage (Henry 6). In August of 1943, the M-43 was 
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standardized and used to replace the arctic, winter combat, mountain, and parachute-jumper 
jackets. It was made of 9-ounce sateen for increased wind and tear-resistance and only two years 
later again replaced with oxford cloth to further increase wind-resistance (Risch 90). The entire 
layered combat uniform consisted of the M-43 worn over a wool-serge field jacket, over a high- 
neck sweater, over a flannel shirt, over an undershirt. However, the 1941 summer mobilization 
was proceeding at such a rate that wool shortages were becoming even more desperately 
problematic. 
Increased efforts to conserve critical materials led to further ad hoc changes to the field 
jacket. A conference was held between the War Production Board and Quartermasters Corp to 
discuss the wool conservation program and possibilities for the elimination of woolen items in 
the M-43 uniform. This untimely meeting was held after the uniform had already been produced 
and distributed, discussing amendments to the finished uniform rather than design during its 
conception, illustrating the lack of foresight in uniform development. The WPB hoped to reduce 
the amount of wool in a number of items, including the 19-ounce serge and the flannel shirting, 
components of the M-43. However, the OQMG representatives argued that at the current weight 
of 18-ounces, the wool serge was already lighter than the material used in previous wars and in 
other armies; reducing it to 16-ounce would be inappropriate for troops located in colder 
climates. In addition, the flannel shirting had already been modified to include twenty percent of 
cotton. To further increase the cotton content would reduce the material’s water-absorbing 
abilities (Risch and Pitkin 25). This convinced the WPB to look elsewhere for wool conservation 
opportunities. As a result, the bi-swing back was removed from the M-43, saving twelve percent 
of wool serge per jacket. A test was also conducted to convert old surplus wool-serge coats into 
wool field jackets; unfortunately, resulting samples was unsatisfactory in workmanship, design, 
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and uniformity but did make progress in design technology (Risch and Pitkin 59). The wool 
shortage spurred the quick response of research into wool substitutes, exploring wool and rayon 
mixtures and reworked wool. Four years into the war, America was still struggling to produce 
substitute materials and uniforms while combating its material shortages. Though innovative 
uniform technologies such as uniform conversion, wool substitute research, and simple uniform 
modifications were progressing uniform technologies, they were occurring in an ad hoc manner, 
quickly reacting to the existing material shortage with short-sighted results. 
By 1943, wool was no longer in short supply and as a direct result, research in wool 
substitutes halted. The number of enlisted men had stabilized, there was little chance of conflict 
with Australia and other wool-producing countries, and America had a large wool stockpile 
(Risch and Pitkin 26). The circumstances had completed reversed over the course of two years. 
Accordingly, the next evolution of the field jacket returned to the use of wool, truly illustrating 
how America’s material availabilities dictated the development of new Army uniforms. 
The M-1944, or the famed Eisenhower jacket, or Ike jacket is shown in Figure 4, worn 
by its namesake, ETO Commanding General Dwight D. Eisenhower. In 1943, Eisenhower 
suggested to the Quartermaster that a new winter uniform was necessary after seeing the 
attractive British uniforms and deciding that “Americans should design something distinctive for 
themselves” as well (Fussell 42). He hoped to develop a uniform that would both enhance soldier 
protection and encourage a patriotic, symbolic fashion statement. Responding to feedback from 
soldiers, the M-44 was designed “with a view to increasing comfort and improving their 
appearance, while retaining their present basic style” of the M-43 (Uniforms Redesigned). The 
shoulders were broadened to give flexibility and the row of buttons on the front were concealed 
by a vertical placket, designed to prevent the buttons from snagging. The Eisenhower jacket was 
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a quick hit with the soldiers because of its high quality 
material, stylish look, and Eisenhower’s personal 
endorsement. 
As resources became more plentiful in America, the 
problem with M-44’s arose not with materials shortages but 
rather with soldiers’ application and interpretation of the 
uniform. Instead of wearing the M-44 underneath the M-43 and 
over a cotton liner as was regulated, they were saving the Ike 
jacket for dress wear and wearing only the M-43 and cotton 
liner into combat, which was insufficiently warm (U.S. Field). 
Soldiers liked the look of the Ike jacket and preferred to wear it 
 
 
Figure 4: Ike Jacket/M-1944 
(Connell 42) for the public and for dress occasions and did not take it into 
combat. The Army had attempted to create a dual-function uniform, but the soldiers had 
separated the uniform into two dress and combat components on their own. This time, a quick 
design and construction of a new version of the field jacket was not enough to resolve the 
standing problems, which lay with soldier preferences and uniform production. Because its 
soldiers would not accept this uniform as both dress and combat, the Army had not fulfilled its 
initial goal of producing an all-purpose uniform. The external material shortages and conditions 
had played a critical role in pushing uniform changes during WWII, but during the end, internal 
issues involving soldier preferences and the need for an attractive uniform turned out to be the 
main roadblock in creating the ideal uniform. This is because by this point in the war, the 
material availabilities had largely stabilized and field jacket material composition had essentially 
come full circle as the M-44 returned to using wool, like the jacket worn at the beginning of the 
war. 
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After the war ended in 1946, the US Army resolved to develop its first truly permanent 
Army uniform. The various WWII versions of the field jacket had been produced out of quick 
necessity with hurried substitutes, creating uniforms that were “expedients for one war only” 
(Fussell 59). Now, with the material shortages and urgency relieved, the military had the time 
and resources to plan and design a permanent ideal uniform. To start, the military discarded the 
tradition of dressing its men in the unseemly olive drab in order to reinstate the impressive 
appearance of its troops. All through World War II, the various shades of olive drab that dressed 
the soldiers drew ridicule from the British who called soldiers “Brown Jobs” and even their own 
American women who called them “Drab Tommies” (Fussell 56). Army soldiers “were the most 
poorly dressed enlisted men in the military services”, a perception that the military was 
determined to change (Fussell 58). Great effort and research was invested in the new uniform 
technology, with contributions from various research and clothing institutions. The uniform took 
almost a decade to produce, finally ready in 1954 and made mandatory and standardized in 1961. 
The resulting uniform was a forest green shade 44, replacing the dreary olive drab, and included 
dressy black shoes and a necktie. Additional components allowed for weather versatility, with 
optional sweaters, a lightweight version, a raincoat, and an overcoat (Fussell 60).  The Army had 
at long last developed the all-purpose permanent uniform it had longed for, made possible by 
material availability as well as the end of the war and its quick demands. 
The plentiful availability of resources allowed the Army to move away from its ad hoc 
tendencies. Throughout the war, the availability of materials, whether scarce or plentiful, had 
truly dictated the course of uniform development. Wool shortages pushed the jacket to change 
from wool to cotton, brass shortages replaced traditional buttons with plastic buttons, and silk 
shortages replaced the tie multiple times. In addition, the urgency of the war was over, allowing 
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the Army time and peace to further their research in clothing technologies, developing the ideal 
camouflage and new synthetic materials. In addition, the Army was no longer pressed to fix 
every small deficiency as it arose, instead spending about a decade to invest in clothing research 
and craft its dream uniform. WWII uniform development had far-reach and long-lasting 
consequences even outside of the Army, on American society. The plastic age boomed and 
became incredibly wide-spread following the war. In addition, by the 1940s, the US’ production 
of synthetic yarn surpassed that of the world, with research laboratories producing yarns that 
were washable, were insulating, and were cheap (Wilcox 169). Uniform development even 
influenced citizen fashion, with American citizens inspired and attracted to the uniforms and the 
symbolism that the soldiers wore (Chenoune 212). Truly, material shortages and the war urgency 
had been the main causes for the ad hoc development of WWII field jackets, for when both 
factors were eliminated with the end of the war, uniform development shifted from ad hoc to 
comprehensive research and a long-term design. While the inefficient method of short-sighted 
uniform design fixes was not optimal for creating a US Army field jacket, the material shortages 
and war urgency made it necessary during WWII. 
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